|
 |
|
Growing unrest in Indonesian Papua
By Chris Johnson
There are increasing signs of instability in Indonesian
Papua, fuelled by Jakarta’s reneging on promises of provincial
autonomy and heavy-handed military repression against political
opposition.
In the latest incident, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI)
reported that four people died in an armed clash on April
10 between security forces and a pro-separatist group. About
30 armed men attacked soldiers in a village about 70 kilometres
from the provincial capital of Jayapura. Two soldiers and
two attackers were killed.
Last month, five police were killed in a violent confrontation
as they were seeking to break up a student-led blockade
at Abepura on the road between Jayapura, the Papuan capital,
and the airport. The protesters were demanding the closure
of the giant Freeport gold and copper mine. The first day—March
15—passed without incident. The following day, however,
security forces, including the notorious anti-riot Brimob,
arrested the demonstration leader and attempted to break
up the blockade with tear gas and batons. Four police died
in the clash and a fifth died on March 22. At least 24 civilians
were hospitalised, including five with gunshot wounds.
A report produced by the Brussels-based thinktank, the International
Crisis Group (ICG), explained: “In the days after the riot,
police conducted sweeps of student dormitories, reportedly
beating civilians and firing shots into the air. Stray bullets
wounded two women and a 10-year-old girl. Police took over
70 people for questioning and so far arrested 15, but much
about the Abepura riot remains unclear.” Journalists and
human rights groups have been prevented by the police from
interviewing victims.
The Brimob commander was stood down shortly after the protest,
not for his heavy handed methods, but the deaths of the
soldiers. Effectively excusing the crackdown, Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said he “understands
how members of the Mobile Brigade feel about the deaths
of their colleagues”.
The Abepura clash followed nearly a month of protests against
Freeport, starting with a four-day blockade of the mine
near Timika in late February. The initial dispute erupted
after local villagers were prevented from eking gold out
of the tailings from the mine—something they had been doing
“illegally” for years. The blockade closed the Freeport
mine for the first time in years, triggering other protests
in Jakarta and Jayapura.
The Freeport mine has been a focal point for local Papuan
anger for three decades. Environmental destruction and the
company’s connections with the Jakarta establishment and
the military make the mine a concrete manifestation of many
of the problems facing the Papuan people.
While huge profits are made by the mine owners and the Jakarta
government receives over $US1 billion annually in royalties,
Papua is among the most economically backward provinces
in Indonesia. A 2005 World Bank report revealed 40 percent
of Papuans live in poverty, which is more than twice the
national average. Papuans have the poorest education and
health care in Indonesia. Between 1999 and 2002, the HIV/AIDS
infection rate increased from under 7 percent to more 16
percent.
The Papuan elite has long directed local resentment over
the living standards and Indonesian repression into separatism.
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 brought a fresh round
of demands for Papuan independence, which was further fuelled
by the Australian-led military intervention in East Timor
in 1999.
Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid sought to head off
demands for independence in Papua, as well as Aceh, by enacting
a Special Autonomy Law in 2001. The legislation gave a greater
share of the revenue from projects such as Freeport to the
provincial authorities and made concessions on other grievances.
The autonomy law included a proposal for the formation of
a Papuan Peoples Council (MRP) to placate local concerns
over the undermining of the indigenous culture by large
scale immigration from other parts of Indonesia. Wahid also
indicated that he would overturn a law enacted previously
to divide Papua into three separate provinces—West Irian
Jaya, Central Irian Jaya, and Irian Jaya—as a means of undermining
Papuan solidarity.
Wahid’s overtures to the Papuan and Achnese elites produced
sharp divisions in Jakarta. The TNI in particular relies
heavily on income obtained through various business activities,
legal and illegal, in these resource-rich provinces. Accusations
that Wahid was undermining Indonesia were at the centre
of protracted moves to impeach him in 2001 and install Megawati
Sukarnoputri as president.
Under Megawati, the TNI rapidly moved to crush separatist
sentiment in the two provinces. In November 2001, Papuan
leader Theys Eluay was brazenly abducted and murdered by
Indonesia’s Kopassus special forces. Moves towards autonomy
were emasculated and Megawati revived the plan to carve
the province into three. West Irian Jaya was formed in 2003.
During his election campaign in 2004, Yudhoyono, a former
Suharto-era general, promised to resolve conflicts in Papua
and Aceh peacefully. Having won the presidency, however,
he has done nothing to reverse the course set by Megawati:
to make no significant concessions to the Papuan elites
and to crush any popular opposition in the province.
As a result, when it was finally formed last October, the
MRP, on which local leaders had pinned their hopes, was
given few powers. Moreover, its status has been undermined
by ongoing disputes with new “provincial leaders” in West
Irian Jaya, which the MRP has refused to recognise. In the
midst of negotiations between the MRP and Jakarta, the central
government suddenly authorised gubernatorial elections for
West Irian Jaya, which eventually went ahead in March 2006.
Jakarta has attempted to establish a base of support in
West Irian Jaya, by encouraging particular tribal leaders
and holding out the prospect of substantial revenue from
a major BP liquid natural gas plant in the province. Its
divide and rule tactics have further undermined the autonomy
law and any Papuan support. After the March 15-16 protest,
MRP chairman Agus Alue Alua declared: “Papua’s trust to
Jakarta comes to zero.”
Commenting on the protests, the president of Papua’s Baptist
churches, Reverend Socrates Sofyan Yoman, told the media:
“The root problem is political status. Special Autonomy
has failed; it brings more suffering. The best way is self
determination for Papua’s future.” His comments reflect
growing sentiment among the Papuan elites for renewed agitation
for independence.
A group of 42 Papuan refugees led by separatist leader Herman
Wainggai were granted temporary protection visas by the
Australian government last month. As Wainggai explained
to Time magazine, he decided to head for Australia in a
bid to gain international attention—that is, the backing
of the major powers for an independent Papua. Like East
Timor, a Papuan statelet would be completely dependent—economically,
politically and militarily—on its international backers.
The hostile response of the Yudhoyono administration to
Canberra’s decision reflects concerns in Jakarta of another
Australian “humanitarian” intervention, this time in Papua.
With opposition to Indonesian rule growing in Papua, there
are signs that Jakarta is preparing for a ruthless crackdown.
The TNI already has a substantial presence in Papua, including
at the Freeport mine, which is deemed to be a “vital strategic
asset”. In April 2005, Jakarta announced an additional 15,000
troops were to be deployed in Papua. There have been a number
of reports of the TNI forming militia groups to intimidate
and repress pro-independence supporters.
|
