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Lessons From the Latest Bali Bombing
By SIDNEY JONES
Terrorists have struck again in Bali, with
all-too-familiar scenes of death, panic, and grim-faced
officials vowing to find the perpetrators. At the top of
the list of possible suspects are Noordin Mohamad Top and
Azhari Husin, two Malaysians, the two Jemaah Islamiyah members
who are believed to have masterminded the bombing of the
Australian embassy in Jakarta last September. But it will
take painstaking work by investigators and forensic experts
to establish exactly who was involved. In the meantime,
it is important to avoid drawing the wrong conclusions from
this latest tragedy:
* This is not a sign that the Indonesian government
has failed in its counterterrorism efforts. Over the last
three years, Indonesia has stepped up security around the
country and increased intelligence sharing with its neighbors.
It has arrested, prosecuted, and convicted well over 250
men (and one woman) for involvement in terrorist activities.
Police have far more knowledge of how the terrorist network
operates than they did at the time of the first Bali bombings,
which killed 202 people in Oct. 2002. They have repeatedly
chased down operatives and the people who help them. Those
outside Indonesia who would like to see a massive round-up
of anyone with ties to JI or other jihadist groups need
to understand that Indonesia is now a democracy, with a
strong aversion to any hint of a return to the bad old days
of arbitrary detention. The only reason the police have
had the political space to do as much as they have is that,
for the most part, they have been scrupulous in ensuring
that arrests are based on strong prima facie evidence. While
the inability to capture Noordin and Azhari is an embarrassment,
it does not discredit that broader effort.
* This is not a sign that terrorist groups
are stronger than ever in Indonesia. In fact,
JI and other groups are almost certainly much weaker than
they were at the time of Bali I, in terms of personnel,
finances, and support base. Not only have the arrests damaged
the organization, but there are strong signs of dissension
within their ranks, particularly after so many Indonesian
Muslims were killed by their previous attacks -- and perhaps
by this latest bombing as well. The problem is that all
it takes are a few operatives and a little cash for a determined
team to carry out an attack, particularly when suicide bombers
are involved. Moreover, men like Noordin and Azhari can
draw on a complex web of personal contacts with other radical
Muslims outside JI. Of those detained in Indonesia for terrorist
activities, only about half are JI members with the rest
belonging to other jihadist groups. Even if JI closed up
shop tomorrow, the terrorism problem would not go away.
* This is not a sign that stability in Indonesia
is in danger. There is little chance that Bali II will have
any major impact on the stability of President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono's government. The bombings took place just after
the president ordered unpopular fuel price hikes that the
opposition thought they could use to undermine him. So,
in political terms, he may benefit from the fact that Bali
II will divert attention away from the fuel hikes to an
issue where he can project himself as a firm leader. Mr.
Yudhoyono has far more credibility on this issue than his
opponents, many of them associated with the previous government
of Megawati Sukarnoputri, who refused to acknowledge the
extent of the terrorism problem.
The attack will undoubtedly hurt Bali and
the tourism industry, and another economic blow is the last
thing Indonesia needs. As one tourist departing Bali Sunday
morning said, "I came back after the first one because
I didn't think it would happen again. I'm not coming back
now." But Bali recovered faster than many expected
after the 2002 bombings and it may yet do so again -- the
reactions in the Asian tourist markets, such as Japan and
Taiwan, will be particularly important to watch.
* This is not a sign that donors should make
counterterrorism efforts their top priority. A huge amount
of donor money, from the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the
European Union among others, has already gone into fighting
terrorism, with a particular focus on training the police.
There's a limit to what Indonesia can absorb on this front
and, in any case, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively
on terrorism at the expense of the other important issues
currently at stake in Indonesia. These include the peace
process to end the 30-year insurgency in tsunami-hit Aceh,
which is going remarkably well. Serious anti-corruption
efforts are also now underway in Indonesia, although there's
a long way to go. Democracy has taken root, even if the
pace of reform in the security-sector remains glacial, and
the legal system is still a shambles. It is not just that
there is more to Indonesia than terrorism -- it's that addressing
some of these other issues may, in the long run, contribute
as much to containing the problem as more directly targeted
programs.
Bali II is another terrible tragedy, and the
culprits need to be found and punished. But the fact that
Bali was struck again does not mean Indonesia has been lagging
on the counterterrorism front. It is just a reminder of
the immense complexity of fighting terrorism in Southeast
Asia.
Ms. Jones is the Southeast Asia project
director of the International Crisis Group.
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